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Cooperation is prevalent in nature, not only in the context of social interactions
within the animal kingdombut also on the cellular level. In cancer, for example,
tumour cells can cooperate by producing growth factors. The evolution of
cooperation has traditionally been studied for well-mixed populations under
the framework of evolutionary game theory, and more recently for structured
populations using evolutionary graph theory (EGT). The population structures
arising due to cellular arrangement in tissues, however, are dynamic and thus
cannot be accurately represented by either of these frameworks. In this work,
we compare the conditions for cooperative success in an epithelium modelled
using EGT, to those in a mechanical model of an epithelium—the Voronoi
tessellation (VT) model. Crucially, in this latter model, cells are able to move,
and birth and death are not spatially coupled. We calculate fixation probabil-
ities in the VT model through simulation and an approximate analytic
technique and show that this leads to stronger promotion of cooperation in
comparison with the EGT model.1. Introduction
Tumour development is an evolutionary process whereby cells undergo a series
of genetic changes leading to acquired capabilities that confer some growth
advantage. In Hanahan and Weinberg’s seminal paper [1], six such capabilities
or ‘hallmarks of cancer’ were identified to be necessary for normal cells to
become malignant: self-sufficiency in growth signals, insensitivity to anti-
growth signals, evading apoptosis, limitless replicative potential, sustained
angiogenesis, and tissue invasion and metastasis. Many of these rely on the pro-
duction of diffusible growth factors [2], the effects of which are felt not only by the
producer cell but byother cells in the neighbourhood.As such production of these
growth factors can be considered an example of cellular cooperation [3,4].
Models of the evolution of cooperation for diffusible growth factors [5–7]
have been developed using the framework of evolutionary game theory for
well-mixed populations. These models have also been extended to consider
spatial effects by placing cells on a lattice [8–10] or a fixed graph [11,12]. For
the most part these models use periodic boundary conditions; however, there
has been some investigation into edge effects [13]. Further examples of the
application of game theory to cancer evolution include the reprogramming of
energy metabolism [14–16], micro-environment dependency [17,18], environ-
mental poisoning [19] and invasion [20]. See [21] for a recent review of
evolutionary game theory applied to somatic evolution.
Cell populations are not well mixed but organized into tissues or tumours,
thus the recent move to incorporate spatial structure is important. Introducing
population structure can have a significant effect on evolutionary dynamics
[22], in particular, in promoting cooperation [23]. The established framework
for modelling games on structured populations, used in the models mentioned
above, is evolutionary graph theory (EGT) [24–30] in which individual cells are
placed on the vertices of a graph and neighbours are joined together by edges.
Individuals interact and play games with their neighbours, thus deriving their
fitnesses. The population evolves via some update rule which dictates how
birth and death occur while maintaining the fixed graph structure. When a
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2cell divides, it is necessary for a neighbouring cell to die in
order that one of the offspring can occupy the empty vertex.
Two commonly used update rules are the birth–death and
death–birth rules which essentially differ in the order in
which birth and death events occur.
There are several shortcomings of EGT in application to
somatic evolution. Tissue and tumour structures are not fixed
but dynamic, due to processes of cell division, extrusion and
motility. Furthermore, the necessity of births and deaths occur-
ring next to each other is not only unrealistic, but the choice of
update rule is one of the main determinants of evolutionary
outcomes [31]. Recent work has introduced a new ‘shift
update’ with the aim of addressing the unsuitability of the tra-
ditional update rules for cellular structures. The model works
extremely well in one dimension [32], predicting enhanced
cooperative success compared to other update rules. However,
the extension into two dimensions [33] is not straightforward
as the shifting of cells disrupts cluster formation of cooperators.
This can be resolved by introducing a repulsive force between
cells of different types and choosing energy-minimizing shift
paths. If the force is strong enough, the shift dynamics is
again an effective promoter of cooperation. However, it relies
on this somewhat artificial preferential sorting.
Dynamic graph models of evolutionary games also exist;
however, they mostly focus on switching connections between
vertices, either at random or to increase fitness [34–37]. These
types of models are relevant in social networks, for example,
where agents can choose who they interact with and can
break social ties with individuals who do not cooperate [38].
They are not good models, however, for populations of cells
which are spatially constrained in two- or three-dimensional
structures. Furthermore, they still require birth and death to
be coupled.
More relevant is the framework developed in [39,40] which
uses a topological tissue model [41] to generate a dynamic
graph representing cellular interactions. In this dynamical
tissue model, birth and death can be spatially decoupled; how-
ever, graph topologies do not necessarily correspond to normal
tissues. In particular all-defector populations have abnormal
polygon distributions, and cooperators on the boundary of a
defector cluster can end up with unrealistically high numbers
of neighbours. The introduction of forces in a spatial tissue
model could resolve these issues.
In order to elucidate what impact, if any, the dynamic
nature of cell populations and spatial decoupling of birth
and death has on the evolution of cooperation, wewill consider
evolutionary games on a mechanical model of an epithelium—
the Voronoi tessellation (VT) model [42,43]. Epithelia are the
tissues which form the surfaces in the body, such as skin,
and the linings of organs.We choose this particular tissue struc-
ture as it can be modelled in two dimensions as a sheet of
polygonal cells [44]. Furthermore, epithelial cells are highly
proliferative compared to other cell types and the source of
85% of cancers making them of particular interest in models
of cancer evolution.
We consider cells interacting via an additive Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, whereby cooperators pay a cost c in order
to produce some benefit b for their neighbours. While other
games, such as multi-player public goods games, may pro-
vide more realistic cancer models, the additive Prisoner’s
Dilemma is preferred in this study due to its simplicity as a
single parameter, two-player game. Furthermore, it is well
studied in the EGT context and thus it is straightforwardfor us to compare with the VT model. In particular, we calcu-
late the fixation probabilities for single mutant cooperators
arising in a population of defectors in both models.
We begin, in §2, by introducing EGT and looking at how it
can be applied to the evolution of cooperation on epithelia, con-
sidering results for an additive Prisoner’s Dilemma gamewith
both birth–death and death–birth update rules.We then, in §3,
introduce the VT model of an epithelium, again considering
the evolution of cooperation under a Prisoner’s Dilemma, but
this time with spatially decoupled birth and death. We calcu-
late approximate fixation probabilities as well as looking at
simulation results. Finally, in §4, we compare these results
with the EGT model, finding that cooperation is significantly
more successful in the VT model. By running further simu-
lations, implementing an explicit death–birth update in the
VT model and a migration analogue into the EGT model, we
identify the decoupling of birth and death to be the primary
mechanism for the discrepancy.2. Evolutionary graph theory
2.1. The model
EGT provides a framework for modelling the evolution of
traits on fixed population structures represented by a static
graph G. Individuals, labelled i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , N for a population
size N, are represented by the vertices, while the edges corre-
spond to neighbour connections. We, therefore, define the
adjacency matrix
Aij ¼
1, if i and j are neighbours
0, otherwise:
(
(2:1)
In the additive Prisoner’s Dilemma, the trait or type of an
individual i is given by si [ f0, 1g, with si ¼ 0 denoting a
defector (D) and si ¼ 1 a cooperator (C ). The state of the
population is then given by the N-dimensional vector s.
For a population in state s, individual i obtains a pay-off
fi(s) from its neighbours which is calculated according to a
pay-off matrix, given by
C D
C
D
b c c
b 0
  (2:2)
where b . c and c. 0. The pay-offs are thus
fi(s) ¼ csi þ b
X
j[G
Aijsj
ki
, (2:3)
where ki ¼
P
j[G Aij is the degree of vertex i (i.e. the neigh-
bour number). Fitness is then defined to be
Fi(s) ¼ 1þ dfi(s), (2:4)
where d. 0 is the selection strength parameter and the con-
stant 1 takes into account other contributions to fitness. We
can let c ¼ 1without loss of generality, thus the game is defined
by a single parameter.
Evolution proceeds via a spatial extension of the Moran
process [24,45] whereby, at each time step, an individual
dies and another reproduces. The offspring occupies the
vacant vertex thus keeping the graph structure constant.
There are several potential mechanisms for this, known as
update rules. Here, we consider two common rules:
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Figure 1. Fixation probabilities for a Prisoner’s Dilemma game in the EGT
model with c ¼ 1 and d ¼ 0.025. Solid lines plot theoretical fixation prob-
abilities for a single cooperator on a hexagonal lattice (HL, green) and a
Delaunay triangulation (DT, blue), obtained from equation (2.5). The critical
benefit-to-cost ratio, which occurs where fixation probability is equal to
r0 ¼ 1/N (grey, dotted line.), is (b/c)*  6.7 for the HL and DT. Simulation
results are also shown for both cases and fit well with the theoretical fixation
probabilities when (b/c). 4. However, as equation (2.5) was derived in the
weak selection limit we only expect it to be accurate near the critical ratio.
(Online version in colour.)
Figure 2. Voronoi tessellation (VT, black) and Delaunay triangulation (DT,
red) of a set of points representing cell-centres. The VT divides the plane
into polygons such that every point in a polygon is closer to its corresponding
cell-centre than any other. The DT partitions the plane into triangles and is
the dual graph to the VT. Spring forces act along the lines of the DT. (Online
version in colour.)
Table 1. Summary of critical beneﬁt-to-cost ratios, (b/c)*, for the different
models: a Moran process with death–birth update on a Delaunay
triangulation and a hexagonal lattice; a Voronoi tessellation model. Results
are shown for both the theory and simulations.
theory simulation
EGT model with DT (death–birth) 6.69 6.74
EGT model with HL (death–birth) 6.68 6.67
VT model (decoupled update) 2.78 2.83
VT model (death–birth) — 7.26
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3— birth–death: an individual is chosen to reproduce with
probability proportional to fitness; its offspring takes the
site of a neighbour selected uniformly at random to die;
— death–birth: an individual is chosen to die uniformly at
random; it is replaced by the offspring of a neighbour
chosen with probability proportional to fitness.
For a well-mixed population, represented by a complete
graph, these two updates rules are equivalent; however, for
an arbitrary population structure, the choice of update rule
leads to strikingly different dynamics. In the following, we
will consider the dynamics in both cases for graph structures
representing an epithelium.
2.2. Fixation probabilities
In order to consider game dynamics on an epithelium within
the EGT context, we consider two different graph structures.
Epithelial cells have six neighbours on average; therefore, a
hexagonal lattice (HL) is a simple approximation. AVT, how-
ever, gives a more realistic representation of an epithelium
[46–48]. There is some variance in neighbour number, but
the mean is still 6. The Delaunay triangulation (DT) corre-
sponding to a VT gives the appropriate graph connecting
neighbouring cells. See §3.1 and figure 2 for more detail on
these terms.
We measure the success of a cooperative mutant by com-
paring its fixation probability (rC) to that of a neutral mutant
(r0 ¼ 1/N). Thus if rC . 1/N we say that cooperation is a
beneficial mutation or that it is ‘favoured by selection’. The
critical benefit-to-cost ratio, denoted (b/c)*, is the point
where the cooperator fixation probability is equal to the
neutral fixation probability, i.e. rC ¼ 1/N.
For a death–birth update rule, we calculate the fixation
probabilities against benefit-to-cost ratio (b/c) for an HL
and DT with a population size of N ¼ 100 and periodic
boundary conditions. Results are plotted in figure 1 in
which each data point is the result of 1  105 simulations.Analytical results are calculated using the theory developed
in [30], where the authors derive an equation
rC ¼
1
N
þ d
2N
(ct2 þ b(t3  t1))þO(d2) (2:5)
for the fixation probabilities on any graph. Here, tn is the
expected coalescence time from the two ends of an n-step
random walk, where the initial vertex is chosen proportional
to degree. Thus these quantities are purely properties of the
graph and can be calculated computationally by solving a
recurrence relation. We use a small selection strength, d ¼
0.025, and there is a good fit between simulation and theory
in the range shown for b. 4. Furthermore, the heterogeneity
in the DT seems to have a negligible effect on fixation probabil-
ities compared to the dependence on benefit-to-cost ratio.
Critical benefit-to-cost ratios are calculated for both graphs
from simulations and equation (2.5) and summarized in table 1.
The results are very different for a birth–death update rule:
cooperation is never favoured by selection under an additive
Prisoner’s Dilemma game and rC, 1/N for all b, c, c. 0
[25,28,31]. Thus within the EGT framework cooperation is
only a successful evolutionary strategy on an epithelial struc-
ture with a death–birth update above a critical benefit-to-cost
ratio of approximately 6.7.
TheHL seems to be a reasonable approximation to the struc-
ture. Using the more realistic DT with neighbour number
Table 2. Table of parameters used in the Voronoi tessellation model [44].
parameter description value
m spring constant 50.0
s natural separation of mature cells 1.0
e initial separation of sister cells 0.1
h drag coefﬁcient 1.0
Dt time step (h) 0.005
l division and apoptosis rate (h21) 12.021
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4heterogeneity does not significantly alter fixation probabilities
or the critical benefit-to-cost ratio, at least in the weak selection
limit we are using. We note, however, that these results are for
an average pay-off and that an accumulative pay-off (in which
pay-offs are simply summed over interactions) can amplify
differences due to heterogeneity. We should also note that
cooperation is possible in well-mixed populations or graph-
structured populations with birth–death update for games
other than the Prisoner’s Dilemma, such as the snowdrift or
stag-hunt games, and it is possible to generalize (2.5) to analyse
these [30].
Whether or not these results are illuminating in terms of a
real epithelium is an important question, however, and as we
have noted previously there are some serious shortcomings
to the model, first that population structure is static and sec-
ondly the troubling dependence on the update rule. Which
update rule is closest to reality is unclear and while there
likely is some coupling in birth and death processes in a
real epithelium, there is certainly no absolute requirement
for birth and death events to occur next to each other.
In order to explore whether these factors are important to
the dynamics we will move on to consider the VT model of
an epithelium in which cells are able to move past each
other and birth and death are spatially decoupled.3. Voronoi tessellation model of an epithelium
In order to analyse the dynamics of evolutionary games on a
more realistic population structure, we will use the VT model
[42,43] developed for the colonic crypt epithelium. In the fol-
lowing, we will explain how the mechanical model works
and generates a time-dependent graph structure on which to
study evolutionary game dynamics. We will then derive an
approximation for the fixation probability and use these results
along with simulation to compare with the EGT model.
3.1. The model
The VT model represents a tissue as a set of points corre-
sponding to the centres of individual cells. These points lie
in a fixed domain with periodic boundary conditions. Cells
move freely in space and exert spring-like forces on one
another, such that
Fij(t) ¼ mr^ij(t)(jrij(t)j  sij(t)) (3:1)
is the force exerted by cell j on its neighbour i. Here, m is the
spring constant and rij ¼ ri 2 rj, where ri is the position vector
of cell i and r^ij is the corresponding unit vector. The natural
separation between cells sij(t) ¼ s is constant and the same
for all neighbour pairs. The exception to this is for newborn
sister cells for whom sij grows linearly from e to s over the
course of an hour.
The total force acting on cell i is then
Fi(t) ¼
X
j[N i(t)
Fij, (3:2)
where N i(t) is the set of cells neighbouring i. By assuming
that motion is over-damped due to high levels of friction
we obtain the equation of motion for each cell in the form
of a first-order differential equation
h
dri
dt
¼ Fi(t), (3:3)where h is the damping constant. This is solved numerically
using
ri(tþ Dt) ¼ ri(t)þ Dt
h
Fi, (3:4)
whereDt is a sufficiently small time step for numerical stability.
Parameter values used in our simulations are taken from [44]
and based on studies of the colonic crypt [42,49]. These
are summarized in table 2. While changes in these values
affect the dynamics, ourmain result is robust (see the electronic
supplementary material information where we consider
changes to m).
The neighbour connections between cells are determined by
the VT of the set of cell-centres (figure 2). The VT divides the
plane into polygons, where each polygon is defined as the
region of the plane closer to its generator (i.e. cell-centre) than
any other. Each cell can, therefore, be represented as a distinct
region with a well-defined area and neighbour set. The dual
graph to the VT is the DT in which the cell centres are the
graph vertices and neighbours are connected by edges. The
DT, therefore, gives the adjacency matrix Aij(t) from which we
can calculate cell fitnesses. As it is defined by the cell-centre pos-
itions, the DTmust be recalculated after every time step during
which cells may have moved, died or reproduced.
As in the previous model, we allow the system to evolve by
a Moran process whereby birth and death events occur simul-
taneously. The key difference is that we decouple the locations
of these events. We also implement the process in continuous
rather than discrete time, noting that a translation to continu-
ous time in the previous model does not affect fixation
probabilities [30] and therefore the results are directly compar-
able. In the continuous time Moran process, update events
occur at exponentially distributed times with rate l. When an
update event occurs, a mother cell is chosen at random from
the population with probability proportional to fitness. This
cell divides creating two daughter cells, which are exact
clones of the mother. A cell is also chosen to die (i.e. to be
extruded from the tissue) uniformly at random. This process
is represented in figure 3.
To calculate fixation probabilities for a single mutant coop-
erator invading a defector population in the VTmodel, we run
simulations as follows.We beginwith defector cells placed on a
regular HL with periodic boundary conditions and the simu-
lation algorithm proceeds until the system has relaxed into a
dynamic equilibrium. We then choose a random cell to
become a cooperator and continue the simulation until only
cooperators or defectors remain. The simulation algorithm con-
sists of the following steps: (i) DT is performed to determine
Figure 3. Spatially decoupled update rule in the Voronoi tessellation model. When an update event occurs, a mother cell is chosen to reproduce with probability
proportional to fitness (blue). A second cell is chosen to die uniformly at random (red). The mother cell divides and the dead cell is removed from the tissue. (Online
version in colour.)
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Figure 4. We calculate LCCn for N ¼ 100 by running simulations of the VT
model and tracking clones. In each simulation, we look at snapshots in time
which gives us a potential ‘state’ from which to find the total number of
degree-weighted cooperator–cooperator interactions for different clone
sizes. This is then normalized and LCCn is calculated by taking the mean
over at least 5000 values. Error bars show standard deviation. (Online version
in colour.)
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5cell neighbours; (ii) forces are calculated and the cells moved
accordingly; (iii) an update event occurs with probability
NlDt, in which case fitnesses are calculated according to the
evolutionary game and the decoupled update rule is applied.
3.2. Approximating the fixation probabilities
Due to the complexities of the VT model, it is not possible to
derive exact analytical solutions as was done for EGT [30].
Instead, we look for approximate solutions by considering
the expected fitness for different cell types in populations
with a given number of cooperators [50]. While the graph is
dynamic and dependent on the spatial distribution of points,
it is also planar and mechanically constrained. Furthermore,
if we begin with a single mutated cell, its progeny are likely
to remain in a cluster as the clone grows. Thus we assume
that variation in fitnesses for cells of each type will be small
for a given number of cooperators in the population and that
the average over a large number of states is a good approxi-
mation. Comparing our theoretical results to simulations,
we find that fixation probabilities calculated based on this
assumption are good approximations.
Let us denote a state with n cooperators Sn ¼ (sn, G),
where sn is the vector of cell types and G is the graph. Then
we define Tþ/2(Sn) to be the probability that when an event
occurs the number of cooperators is increased/decreased
by one, i.e.
Tþ(Sn) ¼ 1 nN
 P
i[G siFiP
i[G Fi
(3:5)
and
T(Sn) ¼ nN 1
P
i[G siFiP
i[G Fi
 
: (3:6)
We can then define the average transition probabilities for a
state with n cooperators to be T+n ¼ hT+(Sn)i where the aver-
age is taken over a large ensemble of possible states.
Substituting in for the fitnesses (2.4) and taking the weak
selection limit d 1 we obtain
Tþn ¼
n
N
N  n
N
(1þ dhfC  fi0)þO(d2) (3:7)
and
Tn ¼
n
N
N  n
N
1 n
N  n dhfC  fi0
 
þO(d2), (3:8)
where k.l0 denotes an average over a large ensemble of possible
states for the neutral process d ¼ 0 and
fC ¼ 1n
X
i[G
sifi and f ¼ 1N
X
i[G
fi (3:9)are the average cooperator fitness and average fitness,
respectively. From (2.3) and (3.9), we obtain
hfC  fi0 ¼ c 1
n
N
 
þ b LCCn 
n
N
 
, (3:10)
where
LCCn ¼
1
n
X
i,j[G
sisjAij
ki
* +
0
(3:11)
is the normalized average number of degree-weighted
cooperator–cooperator interactions in a system with n co-
operators. This can be calculated computationally by running
simulations for a neutral process and tracking clones (groups
of cells with common ancestry). At each time interval, we cal-
culate the contribution to LCCn for all clones in the system,
treating each lineage as a group of n cooperators in a popu-
lation of defectors. See figure figure 4 for a plot of LCCn with
N ¼ 100.
We use the equation for cooperator fixation probability
derived in [51] for a well-mixed population
rC ¼ 1þ
XN1
m¼1
Ym
n¼1
gn
" #1
(3:12)
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Figure 5. An approximation for fixation probabilities in the VT model is given
by equation (3.13) and plotted here (solid line) for d ¼ 0.025, c ¼ 1 and N ¼
100. Comparison with simulation results ( points) shows that the approximation
is good near the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (i.e. where rC ¼ r0 ¼ 1/N), but
breaks down outside the region 2, b, 3.5. This is consistent with the fact
that the equation is derived in the weak selection limit, and suggests that it can
be used to calculate the critical ratio. (Online version in colour.)
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with c ¼ 1 and d¼ 0.025. Points show simulation results for a decoupled update
rule (blue, circles) and a death–birth update rule (red, squares). For the decoupled
update rule, the approximate fixation probabilities given by equation (3.13) are
plotted (blue, solid line) and for the death–birth update we plot a best fit line
(red, dashed line). Fixation probabilities, given by equation (2.5), for an HL with
death–birth update in the EGT model (green, solid line) are also shown for com-
parison. The grey dotted line shows the fixation probability for a neutral mutant. It is
clear that cooperation is significantly favoured in the VT model with decoupled
update rule when compared with the EGT results, in particular, the critical
benefit-to-cost ratio is more than halved. However, when a death–birth update
is introduced on the VT model this effect is suppressed and the critical benefit-
to-cost ratio is very close to the EGT case. (Online version in colour.)
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original EGT model with no migration. (Online version in colour.)
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6with gn ¼ Tn =Tþn . In that case, the transition probabilities and
thus gn are defined exactly for each value of n. For the VT
model, we substitute in the mean transition probabilities
given by equations (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9), to obtain
rC 
1
N
þ d
N
c(N  1)
2
þ b
XN1
m¼1
Xm
n¼1
LCCn  n=N
N  n
 !( )
þO(d2) (3:13)
for the fixation probability in the weak selection limit.
The critical benefit-to-cost ratio is then obtained by setting
rC ¼ 1/N giving
b
c
 
N  1
2
XN1
m¼1
Xm
n¼1
LCCn  n=N
N  n
 !" #1
: (3:14)
Figure 5 compares equation (3.13) with simulation results
for the VT model. It shows there is a reasonable fit between
our approximation of fixation probabilities with the simulation
data in the region 2.0, b, 3.5, where we have once again set
c ¼ 1. These values are close to the critical benefit-to-cost ratio
and therefore represent the region in which we would expect
the weak selection limit to hold, thus this equation for fixation
probabilities is a reasonable approximation. The critical
benefit-to-cost ratios calculated from simulation and equation
(3.14) are given in table 1. For both, we get a value of b/c ¼
2.8 correct to one decimal place. This is significantly less than
the critical benefit-to-cost ratios calculated for the EGT model
with death–birth update. In the next section, we will look
further at comparing these models and attempt to identify the
mechanism bywhich cooperation is promoted in the VTmodel.4. Comparing the models
Figure 6 shows the results of these simulations along with the
theoretical EGT results for the HL graph with death–birth
update and the critical benefit-to-cost ratios are summarized
in table 1. It is clear that cooperators are much more successful
in the VT model, in particular, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio
for the VT model is less than half that for EGT with death–birth update. The question then arises as to what mechanism
is causing this amplifying effect in the VT model, the two
obvious candidates being the effect of cell motility and the
decoupling of birth and death. One way to test whether cell
motility is enhancing the evolutionary success of cooperation
is to introduce an analogue into the EGT model whereby we
allow cells to swap sites with their neighbours. At each time
step, a swap occurs with probability m. When this happens, a
cell is chosen uniformly at random to switch places with one
of its neighbours. Note that this process is independent of
cell fitness. The parameter m is, therefore, a measure of the
strength of migration and by setting m ¼ 0 we regain the orig-
inal EGT model. Figure 7 plots fixation probability against
Figure 8. Death–birth update rule in the Voronoi tessellation model. When an update event occurs, a cell is chosen to die uniformly at random from the popu-
lation (red). From the neighbourhood of the dead cell (yellow), a mother cell (blue) is then chosen with probability proportional to fitness. The mother cell divides
and the dead cell is removed from the tissue. (Online version in colour.)
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7benefit-to-cost ratio for a range of m values and demonstrates
that increasing migration within this framework actually
decreases the evolutionary success of cooperation. It, therefore,
seems unlikely that the ability of cells to move past each other
in the VTmodel is the reason for enhanced cooperative success.
In order to determine whether the spatial decoupling of
birth and death promotes cooperation, we consider the VT
model with a death–birth update rule. To implement this, we
follow the simulation algorithm as defined in §3, the only
change being in choosing which cells reproduce and die
when an update event occurs. First, a cell is chosen for extrusion
uniformly at random. Fitnesses are then calculated for the
neighbouring cells and one of these is chosen to divide with
probability proportional to fitness. This process is shown sche-
matically in figure 8. It can be seen clearly in figure 6 that
changing the update rule in this way suppresses the evolution-
ary success of cooperation in comparison to the decoupled
update rule. Indeed, in this case, we obtain b/c ¼ 7.3 which is
greater than for the EGT model with death–birth update.
Combining these two results, we conclude that it is the
spatial decoupling of birth and death which leads to the ampli-
fication of cooperative success in the VT model. Indeed, this is
an intuitive result and is consistent with results from the shift
dynamics models [32,33]. A cooperative strategy is only
beneficial if cells are able to form a cluster of cooperators. If
birth and death are constrained to occur next to each other,
as is the case for death–birth and birth–death update rules,
then the cluster can only grow at the boundary. If a cell were
to reproduce inside a cooperative cluster, it would result in
the death of a neighbouring cooperator, leaving the size of
the cooperator population unchanged. For the decoupled
birth and death update in the VT model, this is not the case.
If a cooperator inside the cluster reproduces, it will lead to an
increase in the size of the cooperator population with prob-
ability 12 n/N, where n is the number of cooperators and N
the total number of cells. The fact that migration appears to
suppress the success of cooperation could also provide an
explanation as to why, if a death–birth update is enforced in
both cases, cooperators fare better in the EGT model than
in the VT model.5. Conclusion
EGT has become the accepted framework for modelling
the evolution of cooperation on structured populations, ran-
ging from complex social networks to collective cellular
behaviour organized in tissues. While it may be anappropriate tool for the former, we have demonstrated that
a static graph model is not sufficient to capture the dynamic
behaviour of an epithelium.
We have shown using the theory developed by Allen et al.
[30] and simulations that for a Prisoner’s Dilemma on an
epithelium-like structure in EGT, cooperation is successful if
b/c. 6.7 for a death–birth update, where we have used an
averaged pay-off. This inequality holds when we model the
epithelium as an HL as well as a DT, suggesting that there is
a marginal effect on fixation probabilities due to heterogeneity
of neighbour number. However, the choice of an averaged pay-
off could be suppressing the effect of heterogeneity compared
to an accumulated pay-off, as it does for scale-free networks
[52,53]. It would be advisable therefore to compare fixation
probabilities on the two structures for an accumulated pay-
off, although we do not expect a substantial difference.
Vertex degree in scale-free networks follow a polynomial dis-
tribution and therefore exhibit large variance, whereas degree
variance in DTs is comparatively small.
For a birth–death update on the other hand, cooperation is
not successful for any benefit-to-cost ratio under a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. The fact that the dynamics are so sensitive to
the choice of update rule is troubling and neither update rule
is a realistic representation of birth and death in an epithelium.
For the VT model, we are able to spatially decouple birth and
death.We showed, using simulation and approximate theoreti-
cal results, that using a decoupled update rule in the VTmodel
promotes cooperation compared to the EGTexamples. Further-
more, when the VT model was run with a death–birth update
this effect was suppressed and cooperation actually fared
worse than in the EGT model, leading us to conclude that the
decoupling of birth and death is the main mechanism for
increased success of cooperation in the VT model. This is con-
sistent with previouswork looking at shift dynamics on a static
graph which found that decoupling birth and death led to
increased cooperative success in one dimension [32], and in
two dimensions if a repulsive force was introduced between
cells of different types [33]. The fact that cells can move and
change neighbours in the VT model, however, does not
appear to increase the likelihood of cooperation fixating.
Indeed we found that introducing migration into an EGT
model actually suppressed cooperation, and it is, therefore,
possible that cell motility is acting to reduce cooperative
success in the VT model.
As it is the update rule which seems to influence the evol-
utionary success of cooperation most substantively, the
question arises as to which, if any, reflects the behaviour of a
real epithelium. Clearly, it is unrealistic that when a death
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsif
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8occurs, it is immediately followed by a neighbour undergoing
division, or vice versa, as for the death–birth and birth–death
update rules respectively. However, it is also not the case that
birth and death events are completely spatially independent.
Cell extrusion can be induced in areas of overcrowding within
a tissue, which could be caused by high levels of proliferation.
Similarly, if local density is low, e.g. due to a high instance of
cell death, cells canbe induced to reproduce [54,55]. It is difficult
to see how this more subtle link between birth and death
could be implemented in an EGT model; however, the VT
model could be extended to include density-dependence for
division and/or extrusion. Furthermore, a density-dependent
model would allow us to maintain an (almost) constant
population size without enforcing that birth and death occur
simultaneously, another unrealistic assumption.
In our discussion of whether cooperation is successful on
an epithelium we have limited ourselves to the additive Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game, whereas evolutionary game theory
models of cancer have used a variety of social dilemma
games. Extending our analysis to a general two-strategygame should be relatively straightforward, indeed we can
use the critical benefit-to-cost ratio to calculate the structure
coefficient and derive a general condition for evolutionary
success for a two-player, two-strategy game [56]. However,
it has been argued that multi-player public goods games
are more realistic for cancer modelling, and can lead to
very different results. Recent work has considered the
dynamics of these types of games on lattices [9] and DT
graphs [12] in an EGT framework, it would, therefore, be
an interesting comparison, but non-trivial extension, to
consider them on the VT model.
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